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I would like to thank the organizers of this event for this impor-
tant teach-in and convening this panel to address the ways in which 
health professionals have become embroiled in human rights viola-
tions against detainees in U.S. custody.  Just as the embrace by the 
Bush Administration of torture as an interrogation strategy led to a 
corrosion of law, so did it undermine the ethics of the health profes-
sions and the integrity of the tradition, within the military, of medical 
independence and commitment to the health of soldiers and detain-
ees.  What is surprising is not that physicians, psychologists, and other 
health workers can become enmeshed in the machinery of torture, 
from design to execution to monitoring⎯there is a long history of 
such engagement.1  Rather, what is startling is the ease with which 
this role was officially developed and new rules and ethical standards 
that were adopted to facilitate it. 
The shift began in 2002, following the Bush Administration’s re-
interpretation of laws designed to prevent and criminalize the prac-
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 1 See, e.g., British Medical Association, Medicine Betrayed (1992); Steven H. 
Miles, Oath Betrayed: Torture, Medical Complicity and the War on Terror (2006); 
Physicians for Human Rights, Torture and Turkey and its Medical Accomplices 
(1996); Eric Stover & Elena Nightingale, The Breaking of Bodies and Minds (1985); 
M. Gregg Bloche, Uruguay’s Military Physicians: Cogs in a System of State Terror, 255 
JAMA 2788 (1986); Vincent Iacopino et al., Physician Complicity in Misrepresentation 
and Omission of Evidence of Torture in Post-Detention Medical Examinations in Turkey, 276 
JAMA 396 (1996); Chen Reis et al., Physician Participation in Human Rights Abuses in 
Southern Iraq, 291 JAMA 1480 (2004). 
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tice of torture, starting with the White House General Counsel’s re-
pudiation of the Geneva Conventions as a guide to interrogation of 
detainees captured in Afghanistan2 and the Department of Justice’s 
infamous reinterpretation of the statute criminalizing torture.3  
These legal strategies opened the door to the widespread use of tor-
ture .  By late 2002, the Secretary of Defense approved the use of in-
terrogation techniques that included the use of stress positions, sleep 
deprivation, isolation, threats, the use of dogs to induce fear, and 
many forms of humiliation.4  The Guantánamo interrogation logs of 
the so-called twentieth 9/11 hijacker, Mohammed al-Qahtani, ob-
tained by Time Magazine5, reveal how interrogators, frustrated by the 
detainees’ unwillingness to provide helpful responses after many 
weeks of interrogation used newly authorized methods of torture.  
They also reveal how physicians and psychologists became caught up 
in the vortex of torture. 
The centerpiece of the interrogation strategy was long-term iso-
lation and sleep deprivation, and al-Qahtani was interrogated for 
eighteen to twenty hours a day for forty-eight to fifty-four consecutive 
days while he was in isolation, which extended over a period of 160 
days.6  At various times interrogators used techniques including stress 
positions, exploitation of phobias, threats, use of military dogs, tem-
perature extremes (including seventeen occasions when water was 
poured over his head), incessant loud music, and many forms of deg-
radation.7  Among many other humiliations, al-Qahtani was forced to 
perform dog tricks on a leash, engage in sexually degrading acts in-
 2 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to President George W. Bush re: Draft 
Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Conven-
tions to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS 
118 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
 3 Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel, U. S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, su-
pra note 2, at 172; see generally JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 89–95 (2006); David Luban, Liberalism: Torture and the Ticking 
Bomb, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 35–83 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006); 
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM DOWN: SYSTEMATIC USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL 
TORTURE BY U.S. FORCES (2005), available at http://www.physiciansfor 
humanrights.org/library/documents/reports/ break-them-down-the.pdf [hereinaf-
ter BREAK THEM DOWN]. 
 4 BREAK THEM DOWN, supra note 3, at 72–101. 
 5 Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, TIME, 
June 20, 2005, at 26, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,1071284,00.html?internalid=AM2. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
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cluding standing naked before female interrogators and wearing 
women’s underwear, was subjected to having female interrogators 
engage in lap dances and massage his back and neck, and was forced 
to dance with a male interrogator.8  A female interrogator squatted 
over his Koran. 9  He was also told that his sister was a whore, that he 
had homosexual tendencies, and that other detainees knew of this.10
While a Department of Defense review concluded that none of 
these techniques, either alone or in combination, violated prohibi-
tions against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,11 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id.  The techniques used are also described in an official report of the De-
partment of Defense.  RANDALL SCHMITT, ARMY REGULATION 15-6: FINAL REPORT, 
INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY, CUBA 
DETENTION FACILITY (2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/ 
d20050714report.pdf (as amended June 9, 2006). 
 10 Zagorin & Duffy, supra note 5. 
 11 Schmitt, supra note 9.  The United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 
108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/ 
b/h_cat39.htm.  Article One of the Convention Against Torture defines torture as: 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for 
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suf-
fering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or ac-
quiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official ca-
pacity.  It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
Id.  In ratifying the Convention, the Senate adopted reservations, declarations and 
understandings concerning its interpretation by the United States. See Michael John 
Garcia, CRS Report to Congress, The U.N. Convention Against Torture: Overview of U.S. Im-
plementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens (Updated April 4, 2006), available 
at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1339.pdf.  These included a definition 
of severe mental pain or suffering, which was also incorporated in a criminal statute 
enacted by Congress. That definition is 
the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from— 
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical 
pain or suffering; 
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or 
application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated 
to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
(C) the threat of imminent death; or 
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to 
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or appli-
cation of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to 
disrupt profoundly the senses or personality . . . . 
18 U.S.C.S. § 2340(2) (LexisNexis 2007). 
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the State Department, which is responsible for assessing the human 
rights record of governments around the world, had long considered 
these techniques to be violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law standards prohibiting torture.12  The medical and 
psychological literature is, moreover, replete with evidence that harsh 
psychological techniques like isolation, severe humiliation, induce-
ment of fear, hooding, and other techniques can bring about severe 
anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder, cognitive impairment, depres-
sion, and even psychotic symptoms.13  Many of these conditions were 
indeed apparent to observers at Guantánamo and elsewhere.  FBI 
agents and Red Cross officials reported the mental deterioration of 
detainees at Guantánamo and even the Department of Defense re-
ported more than 350 acts of self-harm at Guantánamo, including 
120 “hanging gestures” in 2003 alone.14
The very harshness and danger of the techniques, together with 
the goal of seeking every advantage in devising interrogation strate-
gies that could break prisoners, led intelligence and defense officials 
to bring in doctors and psychologists to help⎯as designers of inter-
rogation strategies, as consultants to interrogators, as “safeguards” 
and monitors, and as medical interveners when needed.  All these 
roles were apparent in the al-Qahtani interrogation log,15 and they all 
became institutionalized as U.S. interrogation strategies developed 
from 2002 on. 
 
The Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war.  Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 13, 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135.  Article Thirteen requires that prisoners of war (POWs) must at all 
times be treated humanely, and that any unlawful act or omission by the detaining 
power that causes death or seriously endangers the health of a POW will be regarded 
as a serious breach of the Convention.  Id. art 13.  Article Seventeen provides: “[N]o 
physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on pris-
oners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.  Prisoners of war 
who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to unpleasant or 
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”  Id. art. 17.  The provisions of Article Three 
common to all four of the Geneva Conventions prohibit violence to life and person, 
including cruel treatment and torture, as well as outrages upon personal dignity—in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment—regardless of whether the conflict 
is of an international nature or whether a person has POW status.  Id. art. 3. 
 12 For a review of Department of State interpretations of which interrogation 
practices amount to torture, see Tom Malinowski, Banned State Department Practices, in 
TORTURE: DOES IT MAKE US SAFER? IS IT EVER OK? 139–44 (Kenneth Roth, Minky 
Worden & Amy D. Bernstein eds., 2005). 
 13 BREAK THEM DOWN, supra note 3, at 48–71. 
 14 Paisley Dodds, Mass Suicides Attempted at Guantánamo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, reported 
in PITT. TRIB. REV., Jan. 25, 2005, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/ 
pittsburghtrib/s_296479.html. 
 15 Zagorin & Duffy, supra note 5. 
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Let me illustrate the last role of doctors and psychiatrists⎯as 
medical interveners⎯first.  In the al-Qahtani interrogation there are 
frequent references to medical monitoring.16  In the midst of his bru-
tal interrogation, al-Qahtani, in protest, refused to take water, and a 
medical corpsman reported that he was becoming seriously dehy-
drated.17  Eventually he was put under a doctor’s care and interroga-
tors allowed an unprecedented twenty-four-hour interruption in the 
interrogation; but even in the midst of receiving medical care, inter-
rogators continued to deny him sleep by playing loud music.18  Al-
Qahtani’s heartbeat became quite slow, and he was transferred to a 
hospital.19  Tests including an electrocardiogram, CT scan, and ultra-
sound were ordered, and a second doctor was brought in.20  Eventu-
ally al-Qahtani was allowed to sleep, and after receiving medical 
clearance, was “hooded, shackled and restrained in a litter”21 and 
brought back for resumption of the interrogation.22
It is hard to imagine a more unseemly and unethical role for a 
physician, who is supposed to be dedicated to a person’s well being, 
than to intervene medically in the midst of ongoing torture⎯even 
administering care while the detainee is deprived of sleep23⎯so that 
torture can continue.  That is why the mere presence of a physician 
while someone is being tortured⎯not to mention the participation of 
a physician as a facilitator, enabler, or monitor of torture⎯has been 
condemned in ethics codes as a gross violation of core medical values 
of promoting well-being and doing no harm.24  The World Medical 
Association’s Declaration of Tokyo, for example, adopted thirty years 
ago, affirms that “[t]he physician’s fundamental role is to alleviate 
the distress of his or her fellow human beings, and no motive, 
whether personal, collective or political, shall prevail against this 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Zagorin & Duffy, supra note 5. 
 22 Id.  For additional roles health personnel played in intervening in this interro-
gation, see Stephen Miles, Medical Ethics and the Interrogation of Guantánamo 063, 7 AM. 
J. BIOETHICS 1 (2007). 
 23 Zagorin & Duffy, supra note 5. 
 24 See, e.g., Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, 
Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 
37/194, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (Dec. 18, 1982) [hereinafter Principles of Medical Eth-
ics]. 
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higher purpose.”25  It specifically prohibits the physician from engag-
ing in or facilitating torture in any way, including actions “to diminish 
the ability of the victim to resist such treatment” or even being pre-
sent when “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is 
used or threatened.”26  Similar ethical standards have been adopted 
by other health professions and by the U.N. General Assembly,27 and 
the American Medical Association’s own standards are even more ex-
plicit regarding evaluation or treatment to enable torture to begin or 
continue.  Its standards provide that “[p]hysicians may treat prisoners 
or detainees if doing so is in their best interests, but physicians should 
not treat individuals to verify their health so that torture can begin or 
continue.”28
Despite these admonitions, the participation of medical person-
nel was fairly common in interrogations conducted by U.S. forces.  A 
survey conducted by the Army Surgeon General revealed that as of 
mid-2005, seventeen percent of responding health personnel in Af-
ghanistan and ten percent in Iraq stated that they had been present 
during interrogation.29  We do not know precisely what role they 
played, but medical monitoring during harsh interrogation, includ-
ing clearance to proceed or continue, seems a likely candidate. 
A second role physicians and psychologists have played in inter-
rogations is as a purported safeguard.  It is unclear whether a physi-
cian or psychologist signed off on al-Qahtani’s interrogation, though 
as discussed below, psychologists were involved in developing it.  
Later on, however, this role became explicit.  A working group that 
made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in 2003 advised 
that certain harsh interrogation tactics should be subject to medical 
review,30 and the Secretary of Defense and other commanders re-
 25 World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Tokyo, Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Deten-
tion and Imprisonment (as amended May 2006), available at http://www.wma.net/ 
e/policy/c18.htm. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Principles of Medical Ethics, supra note 24. 
 28 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, 
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, CURRENT OPINIONS, 2005–2006 ed., opinion E-2.067, avail-
able at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8421.html. 
 29 DEP’T OF ARMY, OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, FINAL REPORT, ASSESSMENT OF 
DETAINEE MEDICAL OPERATIONS FOR OEF, GTMO AND OIF (Apr. 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/detmedopsrprt/detmedopsrpt.pdf [here-
inafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT]. 
 30 SEC’Y OF DEF., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE 
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY AND 
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quired that interrogation plans involving isolation, sleep deprivation, 
dietary restrictions, sensory deprivation, and other techniques receive 
to medical clearance.31  When Behavioral Science Consultation 
Teams (“BSCTs” or “biscuits”) were put into place as a formal means 
of bringing health professionals into the interrogation process, one 
of the purported functions was indeed to act in a “safety officer 
role”32 and be responsible for ensuring that interrogations are con-
ducted in a safe, ethical, and legal manner.  This role and official jus-
tification remains in place today.  The Army’s new field manual on 
human intelligence gathering, issued in the fall of 2006, for example, 
eliminates many previously authorized unlawful interrogation tech-
niques, but retains a requirement of medical approval and monitor-
ing for an interrogation strategy called “separation”—a euphemism 
for prolonged isolation. 33
Let’s put aside the fact that physicians and psychologists have no 
training in this “safeguarding” function.  Let’s put aside, too, the 
ethical outrage of requiring medical personnel to sign off on deliber-
ate infliction of physical and mental harm.  Let’s even put aside the 
fact that, as I will discuss in a moment, health professionals were also 
assigned a function that contradicts this role⎯to design interroga-
tions that would be “effective,” which could include the possibility of 
making them harsher.  The fact is that, as in other cases in recent his-
tory, the dynamic of torture is such that purported safeguards in-
tended to guard against overzealous use of harsh interrogation tech-
niques never work⎯approvals of interrogators’ increasingly 
aggressive methods simply become routine.34  In the absence of an 
extraordinarily firm and persistent objection by the monitoring 
health professional, engaging medical personnel in approving inter-
rogation plans and monitoring for “safety” purposes amounts to giv-
ing interrogators a green light.  At best, this monitoring role requires 
health personnel to calibrate the degree of harm to be “acceptably” 
inflicted during an interrogation. 
The third role is the most pernicious of all: the direct involve-
ment of health professionals, especially psychologists and psychia-
 
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 10–18, 18–21 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http:// 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc8.pdf. 
 31 See BREAK THEM DOWN, supra note 3, at 45--47. 
 32 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 18-15. 
 33 U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS 
(2006), app. M (authorizing “separation,” or isolation, up to thirty days or longer, 
provided certain approvals and “safeguards” are in place). 
 34 Leonard S. Rubenstein & Stephen Xenakis, Torture and Psychological Warfare, in 
WAR AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Sidel eds., forthcoming 2007). 
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trists, in the design of interrogation strategies to break down detain-
ees.  The al-Qahtani log suggests that psychologists helped design the 
interrogation plan, with all its aggressive assaults on his mind as well 
as his body, and advised interrogators along the way.  The logs also 
show that BSCT members directed interrogators to keep al-Qahtani 
from sleeping, among other instructions.35  The psychologists, physi-
cians, and others were assigned to BSCTs specifically for the purpose 
of using their knowledge to assess detainees, design interrogation 
strategies, and advise interrogators.  According to the Army Surgeon 
General’s report, their purposes included “[r]eviewing detainee in-
formation”; “[p]roviding [an] opinion on character and personality 
of detainees”; “[c]onsulting on interrogation plan and approach”; 
and “[p]roviding feedback on interrogation technique.”36  This role 
included identifying the vulnerabilities of detainees and helping in-
telligence officials exploit them.  According to the report, interroga-
tors are taught to interact with BSCT personnel, to learn the medical 
history of detainees with a focus on “depression, delusional behaviors, 
manifestations of stress,” and “what are their buttons.”37  The interro-
gators are trained that this BSCT staff will assist them with “obtaining 
more accurate intelligence information, knowing how to gain better 
rapport with detainees, and also knowing when to push or not push harder 
in the pursuit of intelligence information.”38
One means of carrying out this charge was to bring in Guan-
tánamo BSCT psychologists and others familiar with techniques used 
to train American soldiers to resist harsh interrogation tactics—like 
stress positions, isolation, sleep deprivation, threats, sensory depriva-
tion and overload, temperature extremes, and many forms of hu-
miliation—in a program called Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Es-
cape (“SERE”).39  They, in turn, transformed those methods into 
 
 35 Miles, supra note 22, at 2. 
 36  SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 18-12, 18-13. 
 37 Id. at 19-7. 
 38 Id. (emphasis added). 
 39 See Mark Benjamin, Torture Teachers, SALON.COM, June 29, 2006, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/06/29/torture/index.html; Jane Mayer, 
The Experiment, NEW YORKER, July 11--18, 2005, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050711fa_fact4;  M. Gregg Bloche & 
Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors and Interrogators at Guantánamo Bay, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
6 (2005).  The use of these techniques has a long gestation, deriving from Commu-
nist practices in Korea and CIA-sponsored experiments in the 1950s.  MARGULIES, su-
pra note 3, at 120–25; ALFRED MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 25–53 (2006); Memo-
randum from Dep’t of Defense, Criminal Investigation Task Force (Deployed), 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to JTF-GTMO/J2, re: JTF GTMO “SERE” Interrogation SOP 
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interrogation techniques for terror suspects and had major influence 
in designing and controlling interrogation strategy.  One member of 
a BSCT interviewed for the Army Surgeon General’s report noted 
having received specific training in SERE techniques.40  According to 
the New York Times, psychologists also advised the CIA in devising its 
“enhanced” interrogation techniques, including water-boarding, or 
feigned drowning.41  Indeed, because of their familiarity with, and au-
thorization of, these forms of torture, it is entirely possible, even 
likely, that the participation of BSCT psychologists in the design of 
interrogation techniques significantly expanded the use of torture 
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in the interrogation of 
terror suspects⎯and in the infliction of severe or serious mental 
harm.  The full extent of these practices can only be known once 
there is full disclosure of interrogation plans and practices, including 
disclosure of available logs of specific interrogations. 
The engagement of psychologists and physicians also has had 
implications for the use of medical and psychological information 
about detainees for interrogation.  The Army Surgeon General’s re-
port makes clear that sharing of medical information about detainees 
was widespread in U.S detention facilities.42  Generally, the sharing of 
information was permissive, 43 but in some cases, it was mandatory.44  
Moreover, the report found that rules for interrogator access to 
medical records themselves were vague or non-existent.  As a result, 
at three of the Iraq facilities where the highest number of military 
personnel were questioned for the report⎯Abu Ghraib, Camp Crop-
per, and Camp Liberty⎯between six and seven percent of respon-
dents said that anyone could have access to detainee medical records, 
 
DTD (Dec. 10 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/projects/foiasearch/ 
pdf/DOD045202.pdf. 
 40 See Army Medicine, Assessment Report Interviews (DVD on file with author).  
Assessment Report Interviews may be ordered at http://www.armymedicine. 
army.mil/news/detmedopsrprt/interviews.cfm. 
 41 Douglas Jehl, Report Warned C.I.A. on Tactics In Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2005, at A1.  According to the Washington Post, psychologists were also involved in de-
signing kidnappings as part of the CIA’s rendition program.  Dana Priest, Wrongful 
Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake; German Citizen Released After Months of “Rendi-
tion,” WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2007, at A1. 
 42 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 7-5.  The report noted that de-
tainee medical information is to be protected in accordance with applicable law and 
regulations.  Id. 
 43 See id.  It notes that “healthcare providers will not be required to verbally pro-
vide detainee medical information to intelligence collectors.”  Id. 
 44 Id.  “Medical personnel shall provide interrogators such information as they 
believe necessary to protect the health and safety of the detainee or to prevent the 
commission of a crime.”  Id. 
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and between seven and nine percent said interrogators could have 
access to them.45  At Camp Liberty the percentage was even higher.46  
In Afghanistan, six percent of respondents at the Kandahar detention 
facility said interrogators could have access to records.47  Too few 
health professionals were surveyed at Guantánamo to gain an under-
standing of the practice there, but a report of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in mid-2004 found that medical files of 
detainees were open to interrogators, and that the “apparent integra-
tion of access to medical care within the system of coercion” resulted 
in inmates refusing to seek medical care or cooperate with doctors.48
 When these three roles began to be disclosed in the media and 
subjected to stinging critiques in medical journals in the United 
States and abroad, the Department of Defense, far from restoring 
traditional domestic and international ethical standards, decided in 
2005 to adopt guidelines to explicitly authorize and regularize medi-
cal participation in interrogation.  These guidelines were revised in 
2006 without significant change in the prescribed role for health per-
sonnel, except to state a preference for psychologists in BSCTs.49  The 
guidelines departed substantially from international ethical stan-
dards, including those adopted by the United Nations.50  They did so 
especially by effectively exempting health professionals who are par-
ticipating in intelligence work but not providing clinical care to de-
tainees from the strictures that would otherwise apply, including the 
twin obligations of beneficence and non-maleficence (i.e., doing no 
harm).  The most recent guidelines explicitly permit participation by 
health professionals to act as advisers to interrogators so as long as 
 45 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 12-2, 12-3. 
 46 Id.  At Tikrit, Mosul, and Camp Bucca, the percentage was somewhat lower.  See 
id. at 12-3 and 12-4. 
 47 See id. at 12-1, 12-2.  Respondents at Bagram denied sharing detainee medical 
records with “anyone” or with interrogators.  Id. 
 48 Neil Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 
2004, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/ 
30gitmo.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5088&en=825f1aa04c65241f&ex=1259470800&part
ner=rssnyt. 
 49 DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2310.08E, MEDICAL PROGRAM SUPPORT 
FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS (2006), available at www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/ 
pdf/231008_060606 
/231008p.pdf; Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Def. for Health Affairs to 
the Secretaries of the Military Dep’ts et al., Medical Program Principles and Proce-
dures for the Protection and Treatment of Detainees in the Custody of the Armed 
Forces of the United States (June 3, 2005). 
 50 Leonard S. Rubenstein et al., Coercive US Interrogation Policies: A Challenge to 
Medical Ethics, 294 JAMA 1544, 1545 (2005); see also M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. 
Marks, When Doctors Go to War, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 3 (2005). 
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they are insulated from providing clinical care to detainees.  The 
BSCTs are also permitted to perform psychological assessments of the 
character, personality, social interactions, and other behavioral char-
acteristics of detainees, and based on such assessments, advise inter-
rogators on strategies and methods that are based on that particular-
ized knowledge.  The guidelines also permit the use of medical 
records for intelligence, law enforcement, and national security pur-
poses, subject only to pro forma reporting and approval require-
ments. 
What is the appropriate response of the medical and psychologi-
cal community, as well as the larger society, to the role of doctors, 
psychologists, and other health professionals as enablers and facilita-
tors of torture and cruel treatment?  Their first obligation, it seems to 
me, is to condemn the techniques used as the devastatingly harmful 
infringements on human dignity that they are.  Professionals pro-
foundly concerned with health and well-being have an obligation to 
speak up.  Two years after the Abu Ghraib photos brought prisoner 
abuse to everyone’s attention, professional associations offered only 
general condemnations of torture and said little about the terrible 
harms being inflicted.51  Recently, however, some associations found 
a voice.  As Congress debated the military commission bills in late 
2006, the presidents of the American Psychiatric Association and 
American Psychological Association, along with others, condemned 
the brutality of “enhanced interrogation methods” reportedly used by 
the CIA.52  They went on to say that “prolonged sleep deprivation, in-
duced hypothermia, stress positions, shaking, sensory deprivation and 
overload, and possibly water-boarding . . .  among other reported 
techniques . . . can have a devastating impact on the victim’s physical 
and mental health.” 53
The second responsibility, both of the professions and the larger 
society, is to resist participation by medical personnel in interrogation 
or in any effort to break detainees.54  While this may seem self-
 51 See MILES, supra note 1, at 119–39.  The American College of Physicians, which 
is an association of specialists in internal medicine, was a notable exception. 
 52 See Press Release, Physicians for Human Rights, PHR and Seven Leading Health 
Professionals Call for Prohibition of Abusive CIA Interrogation Tactics in Detainee Treatment 
and Trial Bill; Congress Must Not Cede Interpretation of Geneva Conventions to President 
(Sept. 22, 2006), available at http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/news-
2006-09-22.html. 
 53 Id. 
 54 This includes participation in breaking hunger strikes.  See George J. Annas, 
Hunger Strikers at Guantánamo—Medical Ethics and Human Rights in a “Legal Black 
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evident, it is a more contentious question than it first appears.  At the 
extreme, some ethicists, building on the recognition that health pro-
fessionals sometimes appropriately subordinate duties to individuals 
to some legitimate social purpose,55 argue for balancing the tradi-
tional ethical duty to do no harm against a purported role in protect-
ing national security⎯even at the expense of human rights.56  This 
position is untenable not only because it would implicate health pro-
fessionals directly in facilitating torture that governments themselves 
are bound by law to prevent, even in national emergencies, but also 
because it would require them to engage in decisions about how to 
balance national security interests against the health and rights of the 
individual—decisions they are in no position to make.57
An alternative, and more sound, approach is to ground the re-
sponsibilities of health professionals in human rights law, since health 
professionals have an obligation not to become complicit in, much 
less facilitate, human rights violations committed by states.58  There 
are, however, two quite different variants of this position.  What may 
be called the formal approach is to specify that health professionals 
can participate in interrogation so long as they adhere to the re-
quirements of human rights law prohibiting torture or cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment.59  This is the position of 
the American Psychological Association, which like medical organiza-
tions, has embraced the ethical commitment to do no harm.60  Ac-
cordingly, the American Psychological Association adopted recom-
 
Hole,” 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1377 (2006); see also World Medical Association Declara-
tion on Hunger Strikers (2006), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/h31.htm. 
 55 M. Gregg Bloche, Caretakers and Collaborators, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE 
ETHICS 275 (2001); M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Loyalties and the Social Purposes of Medi-
cine, 281 JAMA 268 (1999). 
 56 Michael Gross, Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Mapping the Moral Dimensions of 
Medicine and War, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT No. 6, 22 (2004). 
 57 See Leslie London, et al., Dual Loyalty Among Military Health Professionals: Human 
Rights and Ethics in Times of Armed Conflict, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 
381 (2006); Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors of Interrogation, 35 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT No 4 
(2005). 
 58 London, supra note 58; Marks, supra note 58; see Physicians for Human Rights 
and University of Cape Town Health Sciences Centre, Dual Loyalty and Human Rights 
in Health Professional Practice: Proposed Guidelines and Institutional Mechanisms (2003), 
available at http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/report-dualloyalty-
2006.html [hereinafter Physicians for Human Rights]. 
 59 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION’S PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY (June 2005), available at http://www.apa.org/releases/ 
PENSTaskForceReportFinal.pdf. 
 60 See id. 
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mendations of a task force on ethics and national security that per-
mitted the participation of psychologists in interrogation, and later 
adopted strong human rights principles for psychologists to follow.61  
Under this view, psychologists may design interrogation techniques, 
assess individuals for interrogation with the goal of devising the most 
effective methods of eliciting information from them, advise interro-
gators about both the individual and the techniques, observe interro-
gations, and further advise interrogators as the interrogation moves 
forward.62  They may be an integral part of the interrogation 
team⎯so long as they take care not to violate the individual’s human 
rights.  Advancing this position, the American Psychological Associa-
tion’s then-president (and my fellow panelist), Dr. Gerald Koocher, 
criticized the view of those who express “dismay that psychologists 
participate in coercive interviews or interrogation at all.”63  Rather, he 
argued, while human rights must be respected, “[w]e must also re-
spect the legitimate roles of psychologists who participate in interro-
gation legally and appropriately in an effort to assure our safety.”64
While this argument has surface appeal in relying firmly on hu-
man rights principles, it is problematic in taking little account of the 
context or realities of interrogation, especially in national security in-
terrogations that take place in isolated settings where detainees lack 
access to the courts or legal representation, and where there is no 
mechanism at all to protect them from violations of rights.  At a 
minimum, allowing participation but requiring disengagement if 
human rights violations are taking place, requires the health profes-
sional to determine what practices, alone or in combination, amount 
to human rights violations, and to do so in an environment in which 
the government has a record of adopting very narrow definitions of 
torture and cruel treatment.  It also requires health professionals to 
try to distinguish between the particular techniques used in interro-
gation and the conditions of confinement that in some cases have 
been designed to, and indeed have contributed to, the breaking 
down of detainees in violation of their human rights.65  Thus, even 
determining when interrogation is in violation of human rights stan-
 
 61 See id.; AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, RESOLUTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, 
INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (Aug.  9, 2006), available at 
http://www.apa.org/governance/resolutions/notortureres.html. 
 62 See AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N REPORT, supra note 60. 
 63 Gerald Koocher, Valued and Varied Roles, 37 APA MONITOR No. 7 (2006), avail-
able at http://www. apa.org/monitor/julaug06/pc.html. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Lewis, supra note 49. 
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dards may be well nigh impossible in the context in which the deci-
sions have to be made. 
Even more significant, the environment in which the health pro-
fessional must make the decision is fraught with pressures and con-
flicts of interest.  As former American Psychological Association Pre-
sident Philip Zimbardo has written, the premise that psychologists (or 
other health professionals) can make distinctions between permissi-
ble and impermissible interrogation, with full power to confront, 
challenge, and expose unethical practices, ignores the fact that the 
professionals are part of an operational team, who are 
susceptible to normative pressures to conform to the emerging 
standards of that group.  They cannot make readily informed 
ethical decisions because they do not have full knowledge of how 
their personal contributions are being used in secret or classified 
missions.  Their judgments and decisions may be made under 
conditions of uncertainty, and may include high stress.  Moreover, 
definitions of basic terms are not constant, but shifting, so it be-
comes difficult or impossible to make a fully informed ethical 
judgment about any specific aspect of one’s functions. 66
Zimbardo also identifies the tremendous pressure on participants to 
be “team players” in obtaining actionable intelligence, and hence not 
to question procedures and tactics being used.67  Questioning re-
quests to participate in interrogations that may violate human rights 
may jeopardize professionals’ own career advancement goals.  Given 
these factors, Zimbardo concludes, “[e]ven intelligent, well-meaning 
and moral psychologists can be seduced into engaging in behaviors 
that they would ordinarily deem unacceptable once they get en-
meshed in situationally defined roles and adopt new situated identi-
ties.”68
Finally, despite its formal attractiveness, whether a technique vio-
lates human rights may not be an adequate standard for assessing 
whether health professionals should participate in the interrogation 
process given the nature of that process and their ethical commit-
ments.  As noted above, health professionals do sometimes subordi-
nate the interests of patients to important social purposes,69 and these 
 66 Philip Zimbardo, Commentary on Report of the American Psychological Association's 
Presidential Task Force: On Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS report), July 
19, 2006 (unpublished, on file with the author); see also Robert Lifton, Doctors and 
Torture, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 415 (2004);  Bloche & Marks, supra note 40. 
 67 Zimbardo, supra note 67. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Bloche, Caretakers and Collaborators, supra note 56; Bloche, Clinical Loyalties 
and the Social Purposes of Medicine, supra note 56. 
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purposes may include breaches of confidentiality to protect innocent 
third parties, the need to control epidemic disease, and other pur-
poses.70  The consequences of loyalty to social purposes rather than to 
the patient may be to create legal jeopardy or violate privacy.  But 
there is a significant difference between the abandonment of the pa-
tient’s interests, as important as they may be, and the direct infliction 
of physical harm or psychological stress that is the inevitable conse-
quence of any national security interrogation.  Interrogation for intel-
ligence purposes is inevitably a deliberate effort to create anxiety, se-
vere discomfort, pain, or stress in the interest of forcing disclosure of 
information.  Thus, it is unlike any of the kinds of harms that often 
befall an individual when advancing legitimate state interests over 
those of the individual.  This does not mean that interrogation is it-
self illegitimate, for while interrogators are not bound to do no harm, 
health professionals are.  Just as in states where the death penalty is 
legal and seen as morally permissible, physicians are ethically bound 
not to participate.71
Accordingly, only a bright line rule against any participation by 
health professionals in the interrogation of an individual will be ef-
fective in preserving ethical standards, protecting the integrity of the 
profession, and, just as important, assuring the society at large that 
the health professions are acting in accordance with moral expecta-
tions.  The World Medical Association has recently taken this stance, 
adopting an amendment to its Declaration of Tokyo that provides: 
“The physician shall not use nor allow to be used, as far as he or she 
can, medical knowledge or skills, or health information specific to 
individuals, to facilitate or otherwise aid any interrogation, legal or 
illegal, of those individuals.”72  The American Psychiatric Association73 
 70 See Bloche, Caretakers and Collaborators, supra note 56; Bloche, Clinical Loyalties 
and the Social Purposes of Medicine, supra note 56.; Physicians for Human Rights, supra 
note 59, at 51–52. 
 71 AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, OPINION E-2.06, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/8419.html. 
 72 World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Tokyo, Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Tor-
ture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Deten-
tion and Imprisonment (as amended May, 2006), available at 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/c18.htm. 
 73 The Association adopted a resolution that provides as follows: 
No psychiatrist should participate directly in the interrogation of per-
sons held in custody by military or civilian investigative or law enforce-
ment authorities, whether in the United States or elsewhere.  Direct 
participation includes being present in the interrogation room, asking 
or suggesting questions, or advising authorities on the use of specific 
techniques of interrogation with particular detainees.  However, psy-
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and American Medical Association74 have adopted a similar stance 
against participation in individual interrogations.  In its role of set-
ting standards for military and intelligence operations, Congress, the 
Department of Defense, the CIA, and other agencies should follow 
suit and remove health professionals, no matter their assigned role, 
from aiding in the interrogation of detainees. 
In an era when physicians, psychologists and health professionals 
play many social roles beyond the provision of clinical care, where an 
ethical stance can be compromised by demands of managed care en-
tities and pressures from pharmaceutical companies, and in an at-
mosphere where obtaining real-time intelligence about terrorism is 
claimed to trump any other concerns, the obligation to do no harm 
may appear quaint.  But just as then-White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales’s dismissal of elements of the Geneva Conventions as quaint 
led to systematic prisoner abuse, abandoning this long-held obliga-
tion would lead only to corruption of the role of the professions and 
an increase in the horrors inflicted on detainees.  Nonparticipation 
of health professionals in the interrogation of detainees should be an 
ethical commitment of the professions and a core element of na-
tional policy on human intelligence gathering. 
chiatrists may provide training to military or civilian investigative or law 
enforcement personnel on recognizing and responding to persons with 
mental illnesses, on the possible medical and psychological effects of 
particular techniques and conditions of interrogation, and on other 
areas within their professional expertise. 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PSYCHIATRIC PARTICIPATION IN INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES, 
POSITION STATEMENT (May 2006), available at www.psych.org/edu/other_res/ 
lib_archives/archives/200601.pdf. 
 74 The resolution provides that “[p]hysicians must neither conduct nor directly 
participate in an interrogation, because a role as physician-interrogator undermines 
the physician’s role as healer and thereby erodes trust in the individual physician-
interrogator and in the medical profession.”  AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND 
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, 10-A-06: PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERROGATION (Res. 1, I-05), 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_recs_ 
10a06.pdf.  It also prohibits monitoring interrogations and allows general training 
for interrogation purposes.  Id. 
